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CRIMINOLOGY
AN EVALUATION OF INTENSIVE
PROBATION IN CALIFORNIA
JOAN PETERSILIA AND SUSAN TURNER*
I. STUDY BACKGROUND
Probation is no longer a sentencing alternative reserved pri-
marily for first-time misdemeanant and petty offenders. In 1988,
forty percent of the 114,000 adults placed on probation in Califor-
nia had been convicted of felonies in Superior Court.' Of those
adults, fifteen percent were convicted of violent crimes. 2 The pro-
bation population has not only changed to include more serious of-
fenders, it has also increased substantially in size. Over the past
decade, the number of probationers has increased by fifty percent,
yet the number of probation officers has declined by twenty percent.
Probation caseloads have grown so large (400 persons per officer in
some locations) that several departments can provide active supervi-
sion to less than one-third of their probationers. Thus, it is not sur-
prising that probationers typically receive minimal supervision and
that enforcement of probation conditions is spotty.3
Most Californians agree that something must be done to de-
crease the threat to the public posed by felony probationers. But
what correctional alternatives are available other than routine pro-
bation or prison? There is a growing consensus that the best hope
for both relieving prison crowding and ensuring public safety may
be intensive supervision probation (ISP), a type of sanction that is
* Joan Petersilia, Ph.D., is Director of the Criminal Justice Program, RAND, Santa
Monica, California. Susan Turner, Ph.D., is a Senior Researcher in the program.
I See BUREAU OF CRIMINAL STATISTICS, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CRIME
AND DELINQUENCY IN CALIFORNIA, 1988 (1989).
2 Id.
3 See JOAN PETERSILIA, SUSAN TURNER, JAMES KAHAN & JOYCE PETERSON, GRANTING
FELONS PROBATION: PUBLIC RISKS AND ALTERNATIVES, RAND R-3186-NIJ (1985).
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more stringent and punitive than traditional probation but less ex-
pensive and coercive than incarceration. ISP is designed to hold the
middle ground between traditional routine probation and incarcera-
tion, in terms of punitiveness, the degree of safety afforded the pub-
lic, and cost. Furthermore, depending on local needs, ISP programs
can be targeted to provide enhanced supervision for high-risk pro-
bationers or to serve as an alternative to incarceration for prison-
bound offenders.
There is no generic ISP program. So many programs call them-
selves ISP that the acronym alone reveals little about any program's
particular character. The only common characteristic of ISP pro-
grams is that they involve more supervision than routine probation
programs. Most ISP programs call for some combination of multi-
ple weekly contacts with a probation officer, unscheduled drug test-
ing, strict enforcement of probation conditions, and community
service. Significantly, in ISP programs, caseloads of probation of-
ficers typically consist of thirty to fifty probationers-far fewer than
in typical routine probation programs.
By 1990, jurisdictions in every state had instituted ISP pro-
grams, and the published evaluations of ISP programs have been
encouraging. Reported recidivism rates are generally quite low-
fewer than ten percent of program participants have been rearrested
while on ISP, and nearly all of those arrests have been for technical
violations4 rather than for new crimes. 5 Fewer than five percent of
participants in ISP programs in Georgia and New Jersey have been
convicted of new offenses. 6 Moreover, many ISP programs claim to
save at least $10,000 per year for each probationer who would
otherwise have been sentenced to prison.7
But despite the apparent promise of ISP programs, it is prema-
ture to claim that they are responsible for the observed outcomes.
The low recidivism rates may actually reflect systematic differences
between the types of offenders who are sentenced to ISP programs
and the types who are sentenced to routine probation or to prison.
Because ISP programs are still experimental, judges exercise
4 A probation violation that does not consist of the commission of a crime or is not
prosecuted as such is usually called a technical violation, indicating that it is behavior
forbidden by the court order granting probation, but not forbidden by legal statute.
5 See JOAN PETERSILIA, EXPANDING OPTIONS FOR CRIMINAL SENTENCING, RAND R-
3544-EMC (1987).
6 See BILLIE S. ERWIN, EVALUATION OF INTENSIVE SUPERVISION IN GEORGIA (1987);
Frank Pearson & Alice G. Harper, Contingent Intermediate Sentences: New Jersey's Intensive
Supervision Program, 36 CRIME & DELINQ. 75 (1990).
7 James M. Byrne, Arthur Lurigio & Christopher Baird, The Effectiveness of the New
Intensive Supervision Programs, 2 RES. IN CORRECTIONS 1 (1989).
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great caution in sentencing offenders to them. Most of the pro-
grams limit participation to property offenders with insubstantial
criminal records, which undoubtedly helps explain the low recidi-
vism rates. Further, although judges may be asked to certify that
offenders who are directly sentenced to ISP would have gone to
prison if the ISP alternative were not available, such certification can
hardly be considered proof that the offenders were truly prison-
bound. Unless the participants actually would have been impris-
oned, the claims of cost savings are exaggerated.
Moreover, past ISP evaluations have not employed methodolo-
gies that permit differentiation between program and participant ef-
fects. Thus, claims about the effects of ISP on recidivism and public
safety are suspect. So far, there has been less scientifically demon-
strated success with ISP than its widespread adoption might lead
one to expect.
The most direct way to evaluate the success of ISP programs is
to conduct experiments in which eligible offenders are randomly as-
signed to routine probation (the control group) or to ISP (the ex-
perimental group). Random assignment helps to ensure that the
outcomes (e.g., recidivism rates) result from the manipulated vari-
ables (e.g., the type of probation program used), rather than from
systematic biasing factors (e.g., less serious offenders being assigned
to ISP). Although researchers have long advocated random-assign-
ment experiments, as of 1986 no such experimental evaluation of
adult ISP had been completed. To remedy this situation, the Bu-
reau ofJustice Assistance8 provided funding for a multiple-site dem-
onstration focusing on random assignment of eligible offenders
between ISP and routine probation. The demonstration's goal was
to scientifically determine what effect ISP has on the participants'
behavior.
In its request for proposals to participate in the demonstration,
the BJA stipulated that the sites had to agree to:
0 Design and implement an ISP program, following the general
ISP model developed in Georgia, which had begun to serve as a
prototype for programs throughout the nation. The basic pro-
gram components were to be small caseloads, employment
training, community service work, routine and unscheduled al-
cohol and drug testing, and curfews. 9
8 The BJA is an agency within the U.S. Department ofJustice that provides financial
support to local criminal-justice agencies that wish to implement new practices.
9 For complete descriptions of Georgia's ISP program, see Billie S. Erwin, Turning
up the Heat on Probationers in Georgia, 50 FED. PROBATION 17 (1986); PETERSILIA, supra note
5; Byrne et al., supra note 7.
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" Participate in several training conferences and technical assist-
ance activities, which would be provided by outside consul-
tants.10
* Participate in an independent evaluation that would require site
staff to collect and maintain core data and to cooperate with the
independent evaluator in the random assignment of cases.
Fourteen sites 1 participated in the ISP demonstration and were
funded for eighteen to twenty-four months at a level of $100,000 to
$150,000 per site. Each site followed identical procedures for ran-
dom assignment, data collection, and overall evaluation. To our
knowledge, this was the largest randomized corrections experiment
ever conducted in the United States. Sites began the experiment in
February 1987, and some continued to accept cases throughJanuary
1990. By the time the demonstration was completed, nearly 2,000
offenders had participated.
RAND Corporation was selected by the BJA to conduct the in-
dependent evaluation of the ISP demonstration. The RAND re-
searchers also assisted in the demonstration's design and
implementation, including staff training, data collection, and data
evaluation procedures.' 2
The data collection and subsequent analysis addressed the fol-
lowing questions:
" Which offenders were selected to participate in the ISP
program?
" Did ISP probationers receive more surveillance and services
than those on routine probation?
" How did participating in the ISP program affect the probation-
ers' future criminality?
" Did ISP affect the probationers' participation in program activi-
ties, such as employment, education, counseling, community
service, and payment of fines and fees?
* How did the costs of supervision under ISP compare with those
of routine probation?
* For whom among the probationers was ISP most effective?
10 The training was directed by Carol Shapiro and Todd Clear of Rutgers University,
and the technical assistance was provided by Douglas Holien and Audrey Bakke formerly
of the National Council on Crime and Delinquency.
1 The participating sites were Contra Costa County, California; Los Angeles
County, California; Ventura County, California; Marion County, Oregon; Milwaukee,
Wisconsin; Georgia (Atlanta, Macon, and Waycross); Des Moines, Iowa; Santa Fe, New
Mexico; Seattle, Washington; Texas (Houston and Dallas); and Winchester, Virginia.




This article focuses on the outcomes of the three California ISP
programs, located in Los Angeles, Ventura, and Contra Costa
Counties. 13 These three programs were selected for separate analy-
sis for a number of reasons. The most important reason was that,
because the California sites were among the first to begin the ran-
dom assignment experiment, by 1989 they had collected sufficient
case data for an evaluation covering a full year's operation (the fol-
low-up period). Also, the California ISP programs were probation-
enhancement ISP programs rather than prison-diversion ISP pro-
grams. A probation-enhancement ISP program complements rou-
tine probation by providing increased and stricter supervision for
those assessed to be "high-risk" probationers, whereas a prison-di-
version ISP program uses ISP as an alternative sanction for offend-
ers who would otherwise go to prison.14 At each of the California
sites, the probationers who were selected to participate in the exper-
iment had already been granted probation; under the demonstra-
tion's protocol, they were randomly assigned to ISP or routine
probation. Thus, these three programs had similar purposes and
dealt with rather similar probationer populations.
II. CALIFORNIA'S ISP AND ROUTINE PROBATION PROGRAMS
When the BJA issued its request for proposals in 1986, Los An-
geles, Contra Costa, and Ventura Counties each proposed a proba-
tion-enhancement ISP targeting high-risk offenders, that is,
offenders whose characteristics, including the length and diversity
of their criminal records, indicate that they have a high probability
of some future serious law violation. An offender's probability of
future criminality (his risk of recividism category) is typically deter-
mined through the use of a statistical assessment instrument. Thus,
when these sites designed their ISP programs, they indicated that
they intended to tap the high-end of a spectrum of offenders arrayed
according to probability of a new serious offense as measured by
such an instrument.
After being funded by BJA, each site made a number of policy
decisions that shaped its specific program. The decisions addressed
the following questions:
13 Complete study results are contained in JOAN PETERSILIA & SUSAN TURNER, INTEN-
SIVE SUPERVISION FOR HIGH-RISK PROBATIONERS: FINDINGS FROM THREE CALIFORNIA Ex-
PERIMENTS, RAND R-3936-NIJ/BJA (1990).
14 Only two of the fourteen sites, (Marion County, Oregon; and Milwaukee, Wiscon-
sin) chose to implement prison-diversion ISP programs. These programs encountered
implementation difficulties which limited the total number of cases handled during the
course of the demonstration.
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* Which offenders would constitute the target participant group?
" Who would be eliminated from participating (e.g., based on
crime type, prior record, drug/alcohol use, location of
residence)?
" What components of general ISP would be incorporated in the
program (e.g., random urine testing, curfews, electronic moni-
toring, community service, supervision fees, victim restitution,
number of contacts) and which components would be used in
various phases of the program?
• How would probationers be moved among the various phases
of ISP supervision, and how would they be added to and re-
moved from the ISP caseload?
• How would various types of infractions be handled, and at what
point would probation be revoked and an offender sentenced to
incarceration?
Of course, site officials made many other operational decisions,
but the above issues largely dictated the nature of each site's
program.
All three programs chose to identify eligible offenders by use of
the National Institute of Corrections' risk-needs instrument, an ob-
jective scoring system that categorizes offenders by risk of recidi-
vism and need for services. 15 The NIC instrument was already
being used by the sites to decide what level of supervision should be
given to offenders in their routine probation programs. Male and
female adult probationers who were rated "high-risk" (i.e., those
who scored a total of more than eleven points on the NIC scale)
were initially targeted as potential ISP participants.
Los Angeles and Ventura Counties increased the number of po-
tential participants by also allowing offenders to become eligible for
ISP if the probation officer indicated a "serious offense override."
This discretion was allowed so that offenders having serious current
conviction crimes (e.g., homicide, rape, assault) could become eligi-
ble, even if their prior criminal records did not classify them as
"high-risk."
In contrast, Contra Costa County limited its pool of eligibles to
offenders convicted of drug crimes or drug-related felonies who
15 Risk of recidivism is predicted on the basis of employment history, attitude, mobil-
ity, drug and alcohol usage, and prior incarceration and conviction history.
Need for services is determined from the offender's academic and vocational skills,
emotional stability, drug and alcohol use, and marital and family relationships. For a
complete review of statistical prediction instruments, see Todd R. Clear, Statistical Predic-
tion in Corrections, 1 RES. IN CORRECTIONS 1 (1988).
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were sentenced to probation for at least one year. Los Angeles and
Contra Costa eliminated offenders with any sex-offense history.
The ISP programs emphasized different techniques for moni-
toring compliance with probation conditions. Los Angeles imple-
mented two ISP programs, one of which utilized an electronic
monitoring system and is labelled ESP in this article. Contra Costa
relied heavily on unannounced urinalysis testing, whereas Ventura
coordinated extensively with the police in making unannounced
home visits.
All of the programs called for reduced caseloads and for super-
vision phases under which "successful" probationers were gradually
transferred to routine probation. The major features of the experi-
mental ISP programs and the control programs, which employed
either routine probation or the Ventura Community Resource Man-
agement Team (CRMT, an existing intensive supervision program
but with less supervision than ISP; see Table 2), are summarized in
Tables 1, 2 and 3.16
III. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CALIFORNIA ISP EVALUATION
Although the individual California ISP programs differed, the
evaluation design was the same for all sites. Each site was required
to (1) assign cases randomly to either the experimental ISP program
or the control routine probation program and (2) collect the data
required for the evaluation and forward them to RAND for analysis.
All senior site staff were also required to attend two week-long train-
ing sessions, at which the research design and data collection forms
were explained. Subsequent site visits and training occurred as the
need arose; the visits usually involved training new staff on the
randomization procedures and data collection forms.
A. RANDOM ASSIGNMENT OF ELIGIBLE OFFENDERS
As noted above, each site developed its own ISP eligibility crite-
ria; and each was responsible for determining which potential par-
ticipants met those criteria. Each site's probation staff was directed
(usually through a memorandum from the Chief Probation Officer)
to screen all probationers to determine those who met the site's eli-
gibility criteria. Once a probationer met those criteria and thus was
eligible to participate, random assignment between the ISP program
and the control probation program was implemented by RAND staff
as follows:
16 A more complete description of the program sites, program goals, and program
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TABLE 2
CHARACTERISTICS OF ISP AND ROUTINE PROBATION PROGRAMS
VENTURA COUNTY
Characteristic ISP CRMT*
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CHARACTERISTICS OF ISP AND ROUTINE PROBATION PROGRAMS
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1. Site officials provided the RAND staff with lists of eligible
probationers, including their names, local identification
numbers, dates referred to the local site, and conviction
offenses. This information was recorded on a master list for
each site.
2. Each eligible probationer was assigned to either the ISP
program or the control program (in Los Angeles, an offender
was assigned to ISP, ESP, or routine probation), according to a
predetermined random assignment list. Each probationer
received the first available assignment. While the site staff had
total control over offender eligibility, the RAND staff made the
actual random assignments of the eligible offenders to either
ISP or control probation.1 7
3. The sites effectuated the random assignment: the
experimental cases proceeded to ISP (in Los Angeles, to ISP or
ESP), and the control cases went to routine probation (in
Ventura, to CRMT).
In most cases, initial screening was done while the offender was
in custody serving the jail portion of a split sentence (i.e., jail
followed by probation). In California, offenders like those who
participated in this study are typically sentenced to six months in
jail, followed by three to five years of probation. At all three sites,
most offenders were screened when they had one or two months of
jail-time left prior to being released on probation.
Because random assignment was a significant departure by the
sites from their normal procedures, we anticipated resistance. That
anticipation was reinforced by anecdotal evidence from colleagues
and from reports of experiments in other fields. However, all of the
sites cooperated and appeared to follow the procedures faithfully.
Two factors seem to have accounted for this: (1) a neutral party (the
RAND staff), rather than site staff, made the random assignments,
.and (2) site staff were convinced that random assignment would
provide them credible information about ISP effectiveness.18
17 Site staff were told that deviations from the random assignment protocol were
allowed only in emergencies, e.g., when an influential judge demanded that an offender
be placed on ISP. These "direct judicial commits" were discouraged, but when they
occurred, sites were asked to provide the names of the offenders. Across the three sites,
fewer than ten cases were directly committed to ISP. These cases were deleted from the
final evaluation sample.
18 For a more complete discussion of the issues and problems involved in managing
this field experiment, see Joan Petersilia, Implementing Randomized Experiments: Lessons from




The three primary data sources for this evaluation were:
* Official record data collected for individual probationers.
* Contextual information regarding program implementation.
* Criminal-justice cost data for each site.
1. Official Record Data for Individual Probationers
Site staff were required to complete three data collection forms
for each probationer. Each form took about one hour to complete.
First, the Background Assessment form was completed shortly after
the random assignment. It includes prior record, demographic and
current offense information. The site data-coding staff relied heav-
ily on the probationer's pre-sentence investigation report for this
information.
The Six-Month Review form was completed six months after
the random assignment, and the Twelve-Month Review form, cover-
ing the period from the seventh to the twelfth month after the ran-
dom assignment, was completed one year after assignment. The
two review forms document the nature and type of services received
during the program, as well a s each probationer's social adjustment
and recidivism. Information for the forms came primarily from the
chronological notes maintained in the probation officer's case
folder. As these three forms were completed on-site, they were
mailed to RAND, edited, and entered into a database to create an
analysis file.19
2. Status (Street-Time) Calendars
Prior ISP research was severely deficient in that it failed to track
the time probationers were actually "on the streets" rather than in
custody during the follow-up period. To compute valid monthly
contact rates, it is necessary to know the number of months the pro-
bationer was actually on ISP; and to accurately measure program
costs, it is necessary to know the number of days of each type of
sanction (e.g., ISP or jail) the probationer underwent during the
follow-up period.
19 Because the BJA had a limited budget to spend on the demonstration, it was de-
cided at the outset that personnel at the sites would have to collect the individual-level
data themselves. Each site was required to set aside five to ten percent of its grant funds
to pay for this activity. This arrangement was not ideal from a research standpoint;
because the data collectors did not work directly under the supervision of the RAND
research staff, the conditions could not be controlled rigorously. Validity checks were
conducted at each of the sites, but the evaluation of the demonstration by RAND had to
rely primarily on the data as provided by the site personnel.
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To record time-at-risk information, two Status Calendars were
produced: one after six months and another after one year. Each
Status Calendar included the dates the probationer was placed on
and removed from ISP or routine probation, as well as the dates of
entry into and release from jail or prison. The calendars were filled
out by the site staff, using information from the offenders' probation
files.
3. Cost Data
A primary motivation for the renewed interest in ISP is the
need to save money. ISP is presumed highly cost-effective in com-
parison to jail and prison. However, money is saved only if the of-
fender placed on ISP was really jail- or prison-bound. California's
ISP participants were not; they were selected from those already
sentenced to probation. As such, the California ISP programs were
unlikely to save the counties money unless they prevented new
crimes and subsequent incarcerations.
Moreover, commonly quoted cost figures pertain solely to su-
pervision, do not reflect geographical variation, and ignore the cost
of reprocessing any recidivists. If ISP results in more arrests, court
appearances and jail time, those reprocessing costs must be ac-
counted for as well. (The average cost to dispose of an arrest is
$1,500 to $2,500.)20 The cost issue is clearly more complicated
than it first appears, and any valid estimate must, at a minimum,
include some of these other costs.
To obtain data for cost comparisons between ISP and routine
probation, we asked each county to estimate the daily cost of com-
munity sanctions (e.g. regular probation, ISP, ESP, residential cen-
ters, CRMT, work furlough) and incarceration (e.g. jail, prison,
halfway house). Costs were then calculated for each probationer for
each service he or she used during the one-year follow-up period,
based on information recorded on the Status Calendars.
IV. THE ISP PARTICIPANTS AND THE SERVICES THEY RECEIVED
A. THE PARTICIPANTS IN CALIFORNIA'S ISP EXPERIMENT
An assessment of ISP effectiveness must include detailed de-
scriptions of ISP program participants, since the kinds of offenders
placed in the programs certainly affect ultimate outcomes. For ex-
ample, if California's ISP recidivism rates were higher than those of
20 Peter Haynes & Clark R. Larsen, Financial Consequences of Incarceration and Alterna-
tives: Burglary, 30 CRIME & DELIQ. 529 (1984).
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other states, it may simply reflect the fact that California ISP proba-
tioners were more serious offenders to begin with.
As noted above, all of the California sites designed probation-
enhancement ISP programs, which selected offenders who had been
scheduled for routine probation but who were judged to need more
intensive supervision. Table 4 lists the characteristics of the partici-
pating California offenders, with the ISP and control offenders at
each site combined. Clearly, the California participants in this ISP
demonstration were quite serious offenders.
More than 80% of the participants at all three sites were male;
their average age was twenty-eight to thirty years. The offenders in
Los Angeles and Contra Costa were predominantly from minority
groups: 9'7% of those in Los Angeles and 82% of those in Contra
Costa were Hispanic or black.2 1 More than half of the offenders in
these two counties were convicted of drug crimes, compared with
about one-third of the Ventura offenders. Twenty-eight percent of
the Ventura offenders, 8% of the Contra Costa offenders, and 15%
of the Los Angeles offenders had been convicted of violent crimes.
Offenders at all three sites had extensive prior records. They
averaged six to seven prior arrests, two to five prior misdemeanor
convictions, and one prior felony conviction. More than 40% of
them had served a prior jail term; and there were prior prison terms
for 18% of the Ventura offenders, 24% of the Los Angeles offend-
ers, and 5% of the Contra Costa offenders. Additionally, 43% of
the Contra Costa participants were judged to be "intensive" risk-of-
recidivism offenders, compared with 73% in Ventura, and 53% in
Los Angeles. 22
Almost half of the offenders in each site had "high" drug-
treatment needs, defined as "frequent abuse causing serious disrup-
tion, in need of treatment." Between 12% and 17% of the offend-
ers had employment-assistance needs rated as "high," defined as
"virtually unemployable and needs training." From 6% to 34% of
the offenders had "high" alcohol-treatment needs, defined as "fre-
quent abuse causing serious disruption, in need of treatment," with
Ventura having the highest percentage.
21 Both programs concentrated on particular county regions whose populations were
primarily minority (i.e., North Richmond in Contra Costa and the Central Court District
in Los Angeles).
22 The risk-of-recividism score was computed by RAND for each offender, using in-
formation collected via the Background Assessment form. The items that constitute the
RAND risk score closely parallel those of the well-known NIC risk-needs assessment, see
supra note 15, except that the RAND score does not automatically place offenders with a




CHARACTERISTICS OF PARTICIPATING CALIFORNIA OFFENDERS







Age at current conviction (years) 28







Other (e.g., DUI, weapons)










Prior jail term (maximum)















' No within-site statistical differences between ISP and control offenders were found,
except in Contra Costa, where 54% of the ISP offenders had a high need for drug
treatment, compared with 28% of the control offenders. The ISP and ESP probationers
and the routine probationers in Los Angeles were statistically different in terms of age at
current convivtion: Routine probationers were younger than the ISP and ESP offenders
(X2(2) = 9.9, p <0.05). Neither of these exceptions was related to recidivism within the
site, so their presence is not troblesome for assessing ISP effectiveness.
b This information was missing for 55% of the sample; of the remaining offenders, 18%
had high employment needs.
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On the basis of prior criminal records, current conviction
crimes, and overall risk-of-recidivism levels, Ventura's offenders ap-
pear more hard-core than those in Los Angeles or Contra Costa.
B. SURVEILLANCE AND SERVICES RECEIVED BY ISP AND ROUTINE
PROBATION PARTICIPANTS
One of the most consistent findings of previous ISP evaluations
is that the mere establishment of smaller caseloads does not guaran-
tee a more intensive level of supervision.23 Clear and Hardyman
suggest that greater intensity is difficult to achieve because "sub-
stantial ambiguity exists about precisely what should be done with
an offender when there is extra time available." 24
There is no agreement on how many supervisory contacts are
required for a probation program to be truly "intensive." Likewise,
there is no empirical literature that identifies which ISP program
components are related to success. While many ISP programs are
modeled after those in Georgia and New Jersey, program develop-
ers often add or delete specific components to meet local needs.
Harris has warned that "ISP programs seem to be continually ad-
ding new program features, with little concrete evidence that these
new elements will increase community protection and/or result in
greater offender rehabilitation. ' 25
During their training sessions, the staff at each California site
were encouraged to give a great deal of thought to program design
and to include only components and contact levels that could rea-
sonably be provided. Each site decided on its own program design
after considering the needs of its target population, its own re-
sources, and its sense of how the ISP program would have to be
structured to gain acceptance from the judiciary, probation officials,
and the community.
This study measured the actual delivery of ISP program compo-
nents, such as service and surveillance. Specifically, it addressed
two questions: (1) To what degree were the planned ISP program
components actually delivered in practice? (2) To what extent did
the delivered ISP components differ from those actually provided in
the control routine probation programs?
Table 5 shows monthly contact or supervision rates, by type,
averaged over the one-year follow-up period. These rates were cal-
23 See Byrne et al., supra note 7.
24 Todd R. Clear & Patricia L. Hardyman, The New Intensive Supervision Movement, 36
CRIME & DELINQ. 42, 43 (1990).
25 M. Kay Harris, Remarks Made on a Panel on Intensive Supervision in Phoenix,




MONTHLY ISP AND ROUTINE PROBATION CONTACT LEVELS
(MEANS AVERAGED OVER THE ONE-YEAR FOLLOW-UP PERIOD)a
Contra Costa Ventura Los Angeles
Contact Type Routine Routine






At home 0.2 0.0*
Total 2.7 0.5*
Telephone/collateral contacts


















Drug Tests 1.7 0.2*
Alcohol tests 0.2 0.0*







0.8 0.4* 3.7* 3.8* 0.2
0.3 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.0
3.2 2.1* 1.4* 1.5* 0.2
4.1 2.7* 5.4* 5.4* 0.4
9.3 0.4* 0.1 0.1
2.9 0.1* 0.0 0.0
0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1
0.3 0.1 0.0 0.1*
1.5 0.2* 0.1 0.1







NOTE: For Contra Costa and Ventura Counties, an asterisk indicates whether ISP
contact levels differed from those of the control group.
For Los Angeles, separate t-tests were conducted to determine (1) whether ESP
contact levels differed from those for routine probationers, (2) whether ISP contact
levels differed from those for routine probationers, and (3) whether ESP was different
from ISP.
Asterisks in the ESP column indicate that ESP rates were different from routine
probation rates; asterisks in the ISP column indicate that ISP rates were different from
routine probation. No differences were found between ESP and ISP.
Throughout the table, asterisks indicate statistical significance at p < 0.05. All tests
were two-tailed.
' Rates were rounded to the nearest tenth; those greater than zero and less than
0.049 are represented by 0.0. In no case did the data contain any true zeroes.
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culated using information from the Six-Month and the Twelve-
Month Review forms. Supervision rates were then calculated for
each probationer by dividing the number of contacts by the number
of days under community supervision, as follows:
1. All contacts of a given type were counted for each probationer.
2. Using the Status Calendars, all the days when the probationer
was on ISP, ESP, routine probation, work furlough, or residen-
tial treatment were counted.
3. The number of contacts calculated in step 1 was divided by the
number of days calculated in step 2. This daily contact rate
was then multiplied by 30 to convert it to a monthly contact
rate. 26
4. The individual rates were then averaged separately for ISP and
control probationers.
As shown in Table 5, all of the ISP programs were more inten-
sive than their respective control programs: At each site, ISP partici-
pants had significantly more face-to-face and telephone contacts, as
well as drug tests, than their counterparts in the control programs.
In addition, in Contra Costa and Ventura the ISP probationers re-
ceived more law-enforcement checks than the control probationers.
Of the three sites, Ventura had the most intensive ISP
program.27 Ventura ISP probationers averaged more than seven
face-to-face contacts, four telephone contacts, and thirteen law-
enforcement checks per month. In contrast, Ventura CRMT proba-
tioners (the control group) averaged three face-to-face contacts,
nearly three phone contacts, and one law-enforcement check per
month. The Ventura ISP probationers underwent drug testing
nearly three times per month, whereas the CRMT probationers had
slightly more than one drug test per month. Alcohol tests were per-
formed about once per month for ISP, but less frequently for
CRMT; however, the difference did not reach statistical significance.
In Los Angeles, both ESP and ISP probationers averaged about
four face-to-face and five telephone contacts per month, in dramatic
contrast to the less than one contact of each type for those on rou-
tine probation. Los Angeles showed the largest absolute difference
in the number of face-to-face and telephone contacts between the
ISP or the ESP program and routine probation. There were no sta-
26 This calculation assumes that no probation contacts are made during jail, prison,
abscond time, transfer time, and failure-to-appear time.




tistically significant differences in any of the contact types between
the ISP and ESP programs in Los Angeles. This might seem sur-
prising, especially since ESP is often seen as a substitute for per-
sonal contacts, but the Los Angeles design called for contact levels
that would be the same for both program types. Los Angeles ESP
probationers were actually hooked up to the electronic monitoring
equipment an average of only about five days per month. The aver-
age is low because only twenty-three of the fifty-two probationers
(44%) assigned to ESP were ever monitored electronically during
the study period.28 Those who were actually monitored electroni-
cally averaged seventy-eight days of monitoring.
The ISP programs studied here involved significantly more con-
tacts than earlier ISP programs, particularly those conducted in the
1960s and 1970s. This suggests that probation officers increase
contacts when given the resources, training, and organizational in-
centives to do so. And while a greater quantity of contacts does not
necessarily mean a higher quality of supervision, ISP officers often
stated that they were "finally getting to do probation the way it was
supposed to be done," leaving the impression that ISP affected both
the quantity and the quality of supervision.
V. EFFECTS OF ISP PARTICIPATION ON OFFENDERS' FUTURE
CRIMINALITY AND SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT
One of the goals of ISP programs is to reduce recidivism, that
is, to reduce offenders' return to crime. It is very difficult to mea-
sure recidivism, because there is no uniformly accepted definition
for the term. Indeed, the literature is replete with suggestions re-
garding correct definitions, optimal methods of counting, and the
most valid sources of information.29
To make the present study as comprehensive as possible, we
used multiple indicators of recidivism. All of these indicators are
derived from official records, not from probationer self-reports.
Unfortunately, official records underestimate criminality, since only
a fraction of all crimes committed result in arrest.30
28 Los Angeles experienced time delays in finalizing the contracts with the providers
of the electronic monitoring equipment, and that hindered full implementation of the
planned ESP program.
29 See, e.g., MICHAEL D. MALTZ, RECIDIVISM (1984).
30 The probability of arrest, given crime commission, is generally quite low. Various
estimates put it at less than 0.1, although it is believed to differ widely among crime
types, from a low of 0.01 for drug dealing to 0.7 for murder. See Barbara Boland &
James Q. Wilson, Age, Crime and Punishment, 51 PUB. INTEREST 22 (1978); Alfred Blum-
stein & Jacqueline Cohen, Estimation of Individual Crime Rates from Arrest Records
(1979) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Carnegie-Mellon University); ALFRED
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A. ExTENT OF RECIDIVISM
Figures 1, 2 and 3 show the percentages of probationers at each
of the three sites who incurred technical violations 31 and new arrests
within the one-year follow-up period, as well as selected court dis-
positions of the technical violations and arrests.
Overall, between 41% and 73% of the studied probationers
had new technical violations, primarily failures to appear for sched-
uled probation appointments, not participating in treatment pro-
grams, or violating drug-related conditions (usually drug use, as
detected through urinalysis).
The extent of new arrests is slightly more encouraging. Across
the ISP programs, about one-third of the participants had a new
arrest, but fewer than 10% had new arrests for violent crimes.3 2
Comparison of ISP and control probationers on the probability
of having an arrest or a technical violation revealed two statistically
significant differences: Contra Costa ISP probationers were more
likely to have a technical violation than those on routine probation
(X2(1) = 8.51, p < 0.001), and Ventura's ISP probationers were
less likely to be arrested than those on CRMT (X2(1) = 7.54,
p < 0.01).
The data collection forms also recorded the ultimate disposi-
tion of each new arrest and technical violation. These data were
used to examine how the different sites responded to these events.
Across sites, between 11% and 26% of the probationers were con-
victed of a new crime during the one-year follow-up period (with the
exception of the CRMT probationers, 45% of whom were subse-
quently convicted).
Figures 1, 2 and 3 also show the percentages of probationers
who were jailed and imprisoned as a result of technical violations.
In Contra Costa, 25% of the ISP probationers (compared with 11%
of the routine probationers) were jailed as a result of a technical
violation (X2 (1) = 5.83, p < 0.02); and 2% of the ISP probationers
and 1% of routine probationers were sentenced to prison as a result
of a technical violation (X2(1) = 0.34, p < 0.56, n.s.). In Ventura,
41% of the ISP probationers and 50% of the CRMT probationers
were jailed as a result of a technical violation (X2(1) = 1.28,
p < 0.26, n.s.); 19% of those on ISP were sent to prison as a result
BLUMSTEIN, JACQUELINE COHEN, JEFFREY A. ROTH & CHRISTY A. VISHER, CRIMINAL CA-
REERS AND "CAREER CRIMINALS" (1986).
31 See supra note 4.
32 Drug arrests included possession, sale, and transport of illegal drugs. Property
crimes included forgery, theft, auto theft, and burglary. Violent crimes included assault,
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Fig. 3-Extent of probationers' recidivism during one-year









of a technical violation, compared with 27% of those on CRMT
(X 2(1) = 1.50, p < 0.22, n.s.).
In Los Angeles, 35% of the probationers on ESP were jailed as
a result of a technical violation, compared with 16% of those on ISP
and 12% of those on routine probation (X2 (2) = 8.93, p < 0.01).
Between 16% and 20% of the ESP, ISP, and routine probationers in
Los Angeles were imprisoned for technical violations (X2(2) = 0.39,
p < 0.82, n.s.).
B. SERIOUSNESS OF REcIDIVISM
Another way to examine recidivism is to investigate the serious-
ness of the recidivism events. Figure 4 categorizes individuals ac-
cording to the most serious recidivism event they experienced
during the one-year follow-up period.
In Contra Costa, 40% of the ISP probationers had technical vi-
olations as their most serious event, compared with 26% of those on
routine probation. The figures are similar for Ventura, where 43%
of the ISP and 29% of the CRMT probationers had technical viola-
tions as their most serious recidivism event. In Los Angeles, 42% of
the ISP and 46% of the ESP participants had technical violations, in
contrast to 40% of those on routine probation. Figure 4 also shows
that between 2% and 9% of the various samples were arrested for a
new violent crime (virtually all for robbery or assault).
To statistically test whether there was a difference in the "most
serious" outcomes between the ISP and control probationers, we
ranked each probationer's recidivism outcomes as follows: (1) no
technical violation or arrest; (2) at most a technical violation; (3) an
arrest. We then ran cross-tabulations between the type of probation
program (i.e., ISP versus routine) and this ranking. In Contra Costa
and Ventura, the severity of recidivism differed for the ISP and con-
trol probationers (X2(2) = 6.2, p < 0.04; X 2(2) = 7.7, p < 0.02,
respectively). These differences were primarily the result of more
ISP probationers in Contra Costa having technical violations and
more CRMT probationers in Ventura having arrests. In Los Ange-
les, no significant differences were found between program type and
the "most serious" recidivism measure (X2(4) = 2.1, p < 0.70, n.s.).
For probationers with an arrest, we examined whether ISP pro-
bationers had less serious arrest offenses than control probationers.
Arrests for violent offenses were considered the most serious, fol-
lowed by property, drugs, and "other" crimes. Each arrested pro-
bationer was ranked by the most serious arrest he or she incurred
during the one-year follow-up period. Cross-tabulations were then
1991] 633
634 PETERSILIA AND TURNER [Vol. 82
va
-~~ ~ .ca 4
4 cu r_
CD 4)D U) 0
CL 0 ) 0 0 6












performed between the most serious arrest and the type of proba-
tion program. No statistically significant differences appeared be-
tween ISP and control probationers in the severity of their arrest
offenses at any of the three sites (Contra Costa, X2(3) = 2.38,
p < 0.50, n.s.; Ventura, X2(3) = 1.18, p < 0.76, n.s.; Los Angeles,
X2(6) = 5.92, p < 0.43, n.s.).
C. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TECHNICAL VIOLATIONS AND
ARRESTS
Most ISP programs require that probationers comply with cer-
tain conditions, such as observing curfews, abstaining from alcohol
and drugs, and attending treatment sessions. Compliance is moni-
tored through frequent visits, random drug testing, random con-
tacts, and other techniques. The implicit rationale underlying the
imposed conditions and the monitoring is that noncompliant behav-
ior should be detected and brought to the court's attention, because
it may signal that the probationer is "going bad." It is also thought
that probationers who are disregarding court-imposed conditions
may be committing new crimes; and hence, enforcement of the con-
ditions, however technical, should increase public safety.35 How-
ever, the relationship between technical violations and arrests has
not been empirically tested previously.
We examined this relationship using several different ap-
proaches. First, within each site, we computed correlations between
the number of arrests and the number of technical violations for
(1) all probationers combined and (2) each type of probation sepa-
rately. These correlations are shown in Table 6.
There were no significant negative correlations between the
number of arrests and the number of technical violations for any
grouping except for the routine probationers in Los Angeles. This
suggests that filing charges for technical violations was not associ-
ated with fewer arrests.
However, filing charges for specific types of technical violations
may reduce subsequent arrests (either overall or for specific crime
types). For example, research has consistently demonstrated that
offenders commit more crime when under the influence of drugs.3 4
33 Such conditions and enforcement also increase the punitiveness of ISP and
thereby help accomplish the objective ofjust deserts (i.e., making the punishment fit the
crime).
34 See JAN M. CHAIKEN & MARCIA R. CHAIKEN, VARIETIES OF CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR,
RAND R-2814-NIJ (1982); M. Douglas Anglin & Gary Speckart, Narcotics Use, Property
Crime and Dealing: Structural Dynamics Across the Addiction Career, 2 J. OF QUANTITATIVE
CRIMINOLOGY 355 (1986).
19911 635
636 PETERSILIA AND TURNER [Vol. 82
TABLE 6
CORRELATIONS BEWTEEN THE NUMBER OF TECHINICAL VIOLATIONS














All offenders combined -0.15
NOTE: An asterisk indicates that the correlation is statistically different from zero,
p < 0.05.
Revoking probation for drug-use violations might therefore reduce
subsequent arrests.3 5 To explore this possibility, we cross-tabulated
whether a probationer had a drug-related technical violation with
whether he or she had (1) any arrest, (2) any violent arrest, (3) any
property arrest, or (4) any drug arrest.3 6 The results are shown in
Table 7. Chi-square tests of significance were computed within each
site for the four cross-tabulations. None of the resulting values
reached statistical significance (p < 0.05), suggesting that there is
no relationship between having a drug-related technical violation
and having an arrest for any crime or an arrest for a specific crime
type.3 7 For example, 24% of the probationers in Contra Costa who
had a drug-related technical violation were arrested for a new crime,
compared with 30% who had no drug-related technical violations.
3 8
35 As noted earlier, the drug violations of study participants consisted mostly of drug
use as detected through urinalysis.
36 Because most offenders had no more than one arrest of a particular offense type,
cross-tabulations were more appropriate than correlations for this analysis.
37 Identical analyses were performed within each type of probation (e.g., ISP and rou-
tine probation). These analyses also failed to reveal any statistically significant relation-
ships between drug technical violations and arrests.
38 While this seems a rather straightforward analysis, it was difficult because of the
nature of probation data. Since a new arrest is always a violation of probation, some
probation officers and departments automatically file a technical violation when a new
arrest occurs. This analysis required that only violations not connected solely to the
occurrence of an arrest be identified and included. The data collection forms distin-
guished between technical violations and arrests, so all technical violations that resulted
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TABLE 7
PERCENTAGE OF OFFENDERS HAVING NEW ARRESTS,
By PRESENCE OF DRUG VIOLATIONS
(ISP AND CONTROL PROBATIONERS COMBINED)
Contra Costa Ventura Los Angeles
Drug No Drug Drug No Drug Drug No Drug
Arrest Type Violation Violation Violation Violation Violation Violation
Drug Arrest 10 11 19 16 15 15
Property arrest 10 9 14 12 0 5
Violent arrest 5 5 3 8 0 6
Any arrest 24 30 35 44 23 34
D. COMPARING ARREST RATES WHILE CONTROLLING FOR STREET
TIME
The recidivism data in Figures 1 through 4 do not account for
the probationers' "street time," that is, time when they were not
incarcerated. If probationers are not incarcerated and remain in the
community for greater time periods, their time-at-risk is greater
than that of probationers who have fewer days on the street. For
example, the ISP probationers in this study may have spent more
time incarcerated during the follow-up period than routine proba-
tioners. If these street-time differences are not accounted for, of-
fenders with less street time will appear to have lower levels of
recidivism, yet this would not necessarily reflect lower criminal ac-
tivity. Failure to account for differential time-at-risk in earlier evalu-
ations of ISP programs has created problems for comparisons of
recividism between their ISP and routine probation programs.
We constructed an overall arrest rate by determining the total
number of arrests for each probationer during the one-year follow-
up period and dividing that total by his or her total number of street
days during that year (i.e., days on ISP, routine probation, summary
probation, and work furlough, excluding any days spent in jail or
prison).. These rates were then multiplied by 365 to arrive at an
annualized individual arrest rate. In effect, the resulting rate is the
offender's expected number of arrests if he or she were free in the
community the entire year. These individual rates were then aver-
aged for each site's ISP and control groups to estimate the number
solely from new arrests were deleted from the analysis. Future research on the relation-
ship between technical violations and new arrests should correct for this bias in rou-
tinely collected probation data.
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of arrests per year of street time. Table 8 presents the study partici-
pants' arrest rates for four major categories of crime: violent, prop-
erty, drug, and other. The overall arrest rates for all four categories
combined range from 0.7 to 2.5 per year, with the highest rates oc-
curring in Ventura, for both the ISP and CRMT probationers.
We used analysis of variance 39 to compare the various arrest
rates for the ISP and control probationers within a site. No statisti-
cally significant differences were found (in Contra Costa, F(1,164)
= 0.78, p < 0.38, n.s.; in Ventura, F(1,161) = 0.80, p < 0.37, n.s.;
and in Los Angeles, F(2,140) = 0.96, p < 0.39, n.s.).
The most important finding, however, is that once the effects of
street time were statistically controlled, there was no evidence that
the experimental ISP programs significantly reduced arrest rates. In
fact, while not statistically significant, the trend was in the opposite
direction in Contra Costa and Los Angeles Counties: ISP probation-
ers had higher arrest rates than those on routine probation. The
high arrest rates of Ventura ISP probationers are probably because
Ventura had the most intensive program, with strong police
involvement.
TABLE 8
AVERAGE NUMBER OF ARRESTS PER PROBATIONER
ASSUMING ONE YEAR OF STREET TIME
Contra Costa Ventura Los Angeles
Crime Routine Routine
Category ISP Probation ISP CRMT ESP ISP Probation
Violent 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.1
Property 0.4 0.2 0.8 0.7 0.4 0.1 0.1
Drug 0.4 0.3 0.6 1.1 0.5 0.7 0.6
Other 0.1 0.2 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.1
All crimes
combined 1.0 0.7 2.1 2.5 1.4 1.3 0.8
E. ISSUES IN MEASURING RECIDIVISM
A central question regarding ISP recidivism outcomes is the ex-
tent to which they reflect measurement bias, since ISP may increase
opportunities to observe technical violations and new criminal be-
havior. If we knew true offender behavior (which perhaps could be
obtained through offender self-reports), we could directly estimate
39 Analysis of variance is a statistical technique for simultaneous comparison of
means in order to determine if some statistical relation exists between the experimental




the extent of the measurement bias. We do not have such data, so
we tested for the measurement bias using data from official records.
We calculated the correlations between the total number of
contacts (combining face-to-face, collateral, monitoring, and drug
checks) and the following indicators of recidivism: (1) any arrest, (2)
any technical violation, (3) the number of technical violations, and
(4) the number of arrests. We examined the correlations within ISP
and control groups separately, and in no case did we observe a posi-
tive relationship between the number of contacts and any of the four
recidivism measures. 40 Thus, it does not appear that the recidivism
rates of ISP probationers were artificially high because of greater
opportunities to observe the failure of ISP probationers in the
community.
F. SURVIVAL ANALYSIS
Our final recidivism analysis was a survival analysis, measuring
the pace of recidivism among probationers. 4 1 This type of analysis
specifies the proportion of probationers who survive by not
recidivating (and, conversely, the proportion who fail) across speci-
fied intervals during the follow-up period. The specified intervals
may be months, weeks, or even days. Survival analysis thus provides
more precision and specificity than fixed-time interval analysis.
While the previous analyses showed that the annualized arrest rates
did not differ between ISP and control probationers, survival analy-
sis could detect, for example, that one group's failure rate during
the first several months of the year was considerably higher than
that of the other group.
Selecting the most appropriate survival analysis model for a
given application requires an understanding of the strengths and
weaknesses of the possible models and how well each is suited to the
characteristics of the available data and the research questions being
addressed. After reviewing the most popular survival models, we
chose the Kaplan-Meier model for this analysis.42
40 We also performed correlations for ISP and control probationers combined.
These analyses revealed a significant positive correlation (0.18) between the number of
technical violations and contacts in Contra Costa; a significant negative correlation be-
tween the number of contacts and any arrest in Ventura; and a significant negative corre-
lation between contacts and any technical violation in Los Angeles. These results mirror
the overall recidivism outcomes, as we would expect, given the high correlation between
contacts and type of probation program (0.67 in Contra Costa, 0.69 in Ventura, and
0.50 in Los Angeles).
41 See MALTZ, supra note 29; PETER SCHMIDT & ANN DRYDEN WITrE, PREDICTING RE-
CIDIVISM USING SURVIVAL MODELS (1988).
42 The life-table model was also applied to these data, and the results were virtually
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Like all survival analysis, the Kaplan-Meier model derives meas-
ures based on two assumptions: (1) that "terminal" cases cease to
remain exposed to risk after they terminate (e.g., once a probationer
is arrested or has a technical violation, he or she is no longer at risk
of failing again); and (2) that "censored observations" are treated as
nonterminal "withdrawals" (e.g., if a probationer dies or is trans-
ferred, he or she is not considered to have either failed or survived,
but is simply dropped from the analysis). For survival analysis, it is
necessary to determine which events (and their corresponding
dates) will serve to remove ("censor") an individual from the analy-
sis. For this study, probationers were removed when they died,
were transferred, or were terminated from supervision.
Figure 5 presents the monthly survival rates across the one-year
follow-up period, using two recidivism measures: (1) time until first
technical violation, and (2) time until first arrest. The time intervals
were measured from the first day the probationer was on the street
(for most of the probationers, this was the day he or she was re-
leased from jail for the current offense and returned to the commu-
nity on probation). The mean survival times across all sites and
programs were between five and nine months. In Contra Costa, the
ISP probationers "survived" for shorter times (i.e. recividated
sooner) when recidivism was measured by the occurrence of a new
technical violation (Wilcoxon X2(1) = 18.00, p < 0.001), but there
were no differences when recidivism was measured by the occur-
rence of a new arrest (Wilcoxon X2(1) = 0.18, p < 0.67, n.s.).
In Ventura, the opposite was true: ISP and CRMT probationers
recidivated at the same pace when technical violations were the mea-
sure (Wilcoxon X2(1) = 0.12, p < 0.73, n.s.), but the CRMT proba-
tioners recidivated sooner for arrest than the ISP probationers
(Wilcoxon X2 (1) = 4.90, p < 0.03).
The data suggest that ISP (or ESP) probationers in Los Angeles
will recidivate faster than routine probationers when technical viola-
tions are the criterion (Wilcoxon X2 (2) = 9.17, p < 0.01), but there
will be no difference between the two groups when arrests are the
measure (Wilcoxon X2(2) = 0.41, p < 0.81, n.s.).
identical to those obtained by the Kaplan-Meier model. The Kaplan-Meier model was
used in the Massachusetts ISP evaluation, see James M. Byrne & Linda Kelly, An Evalua-
tion of the Implementation and Impact of the Massachusetts Intensive Probation Super-
vision Program (1989) (unpublished manuscript on file with the authors), and the
Illinois Criminal Justice Authority evaluation. See Illinois Criminal Justice Information
Authority, The Pace of Recidivism in Illinois, 2 RES. BULL. 1 (April 1986). Wheeler and
Hissong also used this method to analyze time to failure for misdemeanor offenses.
Gerald R. Wheeler & Rodney V. Hissong, A Survival Time Analysis of Criminal Sanctions for
Misdemeanor Offenders, 12 EVALUATION REv. 510 (1988).
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G. EFFECTS OF ISP ON OFFENDERS' EMPLOYMENT, EDUCATION,
COUNSELING, COMMUNITY SERVICE, AND PAYMENT OF
FINES AND FEES
Although routine probation sometimes involves employment,
treatment, or community service, ISP typically emphasizes and often
even mandates participation in these and other related program ac-
tivities, such as counseling, training, victim restitution, and fee re-
payment. Because probationer participation in these kinds of
program activities is usually considered to be a central part of ISP, it
is important to determine the level of actual participation by ISP
probationers compared to routine probationers. Figure 6 shows the
percentage of probationers who participated in various program ac-
tivities during the one-year follow-up period. Any participation dur-
ing this period was counted, regardless of its intensity.
The level of participation was generally quite low, particularly
in Los Angeles, where 17% of the ESP and 16% of the ISP proba-
tioners participated in counseling during the study period, com-
pared with 2% of the routine probationers (X2(2) = 6.72,
p < 0.04). In Contra Costa, 39% of the ISP probationers received
counseling, as did 14% of the routine probationers (X2(1) = 13.32,
p < 0.001). In both counties, officials reported a serious lack of
treatment programs for drug-involved probationers. Program par-
ticipation was much higher in Ventura, where 78% of the ISP and
76% of the CRMT probationers received counseling (X2 (1) = 0.08,
p < 0.77, n.s.).
To enable more extensive analysis of program participation, we
calculated a program-participation score for each offender by as-
signing one point for participation in each of the following activities
during the one-year follow-up period:
* Any employment during the year.
" Any counseling sessions attended.
" Any community service performed.
" Any restitution during the year.
Thus, each probationer had a program-participation score of
zero to four. The ISP model asserts that, theoretically, the more a
probationer participates in these program activities, the better his
chances are of law-abiding behavior.43 Table 9 shows the percent-
43 Correlations between pairs of individual activities and the summary scale were
generally above 0.4. Correlations between pairs of possible individual activities ranged
from 0.05 to 0.31. Chronbach's alpha ranged from 0.42 in Ventura and 0.43 Los Ange-
les to 0.24 in Contra Costa. LeeJ. Chronbach, Coefficient Alpha and the Internal Structure of
Tests, 16 PSYCHOMETRIKA 297 (1951).
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PERCENTAGE OF OFFENDERS PARTICIPATING IN PROGRAMS:
SUMMARY MEASURE
(PERCENTAGE OF STUDY SAMPLE)
Contra Costa Ventura Los Angeles
Program
Participation Score Routine Routine
ISP Probation ISP CRMT ESP ISP Probation
0 (no participation) 40* 64 10 6 46 + 45* 78
1 37 33 18 22 27 33 14
2 22 2 41 42 23 14 8
3 1 1 26 26 4 6 0
4 (participates in
all activities) 0 0 5 5 0 2 0
NOTE: An asterisk indicates that the ISP program-participation score is significantly
different from that of routine probation; a plus sign indicates that the score for ESP
is significantly different from that for routine probation in Los Angeles.
ages of probationers at each program-participation level at each site.
We then cross-tabulated the program-participation scores with
the type of probation program (i.e., ISP or control). In both Contra
Costa and Los Angeles, ISP (and ESP) probationers had higher
program-participation scores than their counterparts on routine
probation (X2(3) = 18.46, p < 0.001; X2 (8) = 18.29, p < 0.02,
respectively). Although there were no differences between the
scores of ISP and CRMT probationers in Ventura (X2(4) = 1.39,
p < 0.85, n.s.), the overall program participation in Ventura was
higher than in Contra Costa and Los Angeles.
H. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PROGRAM PARTICIPATION AND
RECIDIVISM
We also explored the relationship between probationers'
program participation (as measured in Table 9) and recidivism.
For this analysis, we cross-tabulated each probationer's program-
participation score with whether he or she had either a new techni-
cal violation or a new arrest within the one-year follow-up period.
Table 10 shows that for all three sites, program participation was
associated with decreased recidivism (Contra Costa, X2(3) = 8.86,
p < 0.04; Ventura, X2(4) = 14.23, p < 0.01; Los Angeles,
X2 (4) = 20.83, p < 0.001). 44
This analysis does not incorporate the random-assignment as-
44 Additional analyses, not shown here, found that the relationship between program




pect of the ISP demonstration, since the degree of program partici-
pation was not randomly assigned among probationers. Thus,
selection processes may be operating. In particular, higher
program-participation scores may be correlated with lower risk. In
other words, "better" probationers may not only have lower recidi-
vism rates, they may also participate in more programs. If this is the
case, program participation should not be viewed as causing a re-
duction in recidivism; the two items are simply correlated.
TABLE 10
RECIDIVISM, By PROGRAM PARTICIPATION AND SITE
(PERCENTAGE OF SAMPLE HAVING EITHER
A TECHNICAL VIOLATION OR AN ARREST)
Program
Participation Score Contra Costa Ventura Los Angeles
0 70* 77* 87*
1 53 94 63
2 57 83 52
3 0a 61 100a
4 NA 88
a  0
NOTE: An asterisk indicates that program participation was related to recidivism, using
X2 tests of significance.
Based on five or fewer cases.
To examine this possibility, each probationer's program-
participation score was correlated with his or her risk-of-recidivism
score.45 In Ventura and Los Angeles, higher-risk probationers had
lower program-participation scores (r = -0.22, p < 0.05;
r = -0.20, p < 0.05, respectively). In Contra Costa, no correlation
existed between program participation and risk score (r = -0.02,
p > 0.84, n.s.).
To determine whether the observed relationship between
program participation and recidivism disappears when the
probationer's risk level is statistically controlled, we used logistic
regression to model each recidivism outcome as a function of
(1) probationer's risk level and (2) program participation. The
results show that in Contra Costa and Los Angeles, program
participation remained associated with lower recidivism (b = 0.55,
p < 0.02 for Contra Costa; and b = 0.51, p < 0.02 for Los
Angeles). In Ventura, however, program participation was not
related to recidivism, once probationer risk was controlled (b =
45 See supra note 22.
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0.23, p < 0.31, n.s.). This may reflect the fact that nearly all
Ventura probationers were high-risk, and nearly all participated in
programs.
I. THE PROBATIONERS FOR WHOM ISP WAS MOST EFFECTIVE
It is now well accepted that treatment programs are not equally
effective for all offenders and that the appropriate question to ask
when looking at outcomes is not Did it work? but rather For whom did
it work best? Erwin suggests that ISP works best for drug offenders;46
Byrne and Kelly47 suggest that employed ISP probationers have
lower recidivism rates and that higher levels of ISP program imple-
mentation (e.g. incorporating both treatment and surveillance) are
associated with success.
Although our analysis did not find ISP to be more effective than
routine probation in reducing recidivism overall, we wanted to in-
vestigate whether it might be more effective for some subgroups of the
population. If this were the case, future ISP programs could be tai-
lored to those subgroups for whom they appear most effective.
Prior probation research has shown that certain background
characteristics are related to recidivism. 48 Drawing on that research,
we selected the following variables to test the differential effective-
ness of ISP:
Sex (male, female)
Race (white, black, Hispanic)
Age (<26, 26-30, 31+)
Recidivism risk (1-5, 6-10, 11-15, 16+)
Prior record (less than jail, jail or worse)
Living arrangement (with spouse, all other arrangements)
Drug-treatment needs (high, other)
Any paid employment during one-year follow-up period (yes, no)
ISP implementation score4 9(low, moderate, high)
We examined whether the interaction between probationers'
46 BILLIE S. ERWIN, EVALUATION OF INTENSIVE PROBATION SUPERVISION IN GEORGIA
(1987).
47 See Byrne & Kelly, supra note 42.
48 See PETERSILIA et al., supra note 3;JOAN PETERSILIA, SUSAN TURNER &JOYCE PETER-
SON, PRISON VERSUS PROBATION IN CALIFORNIA: IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIME AND OFFENDER
RECIVIDISM, RAND R-3323-NIJ (1986); Gennaro F. Vito, Felony Probation and Recidivism:
Replication and Response, 50 FED. PROBATION 17 (1987); David A. Pritchard, Stable Predictors
of Recidivism: A Summary, 17 CRIMINOLOGY 15 (1979).
49 In analysis not shown here, each ISP probationer received an implementation
score, which measured the extent to which he or she received the planned ISP program.
This type of implementation measure was necessary to assess whether receiving the
"full" ISP model was associated with various outcomes. Offenders who received 50% or
less of planned services received a "low" implementation score, offenders receiving
51% to 79% of planned services received a "medium" score, and offenders receiving
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background characteristics and the type of probation program was
significantly related to any of three recidivism outcomes: any techni-
cal violation, any arrest, and any technical violation or arrest. We
used multiple logistic regression to model each outcome as a func-
tion of (1) the background characteristic, (2) the type of probation
program used, and (3) the interaction between background charac-
teristic and program type. These analyses showed no statistically
significant interaction effect between any background characteristic
and program type, for any of the three recidivism outcomes.50 In
short, ISP does not appear differentially effective for offenders with
different background characteristics. 5 1
VI. COST COMPARISON OF ISP AND ROUTINE PROBATION
One goal of this study was to estimate the total criminal-justice
dollars spent on each probationer during the one-year follow-up pe-
riod, including both corrections and court costs. 5 2 We did this by:
1. Estimating the costs of each type of local sanction or service
"used" by the probationers.
2. Using information from the Status Calendars and Six-Month
and Twelve-Month Review forms on each probationer's where-
abouts (e.g., in jail, on ISP) on each day in the follow-up period
to "bill" each probationer for each service used.
3. Averaging across all probationers, within a given site, in the
ISP and control programs.
Information on the daily costs of supervision and incarceration
was collected from each of the three California counties. The site-
specific information was quite similar across sites, so the estimates
80%o to 100%o of planned services received a "high" score. Complete results of the
implementation analysis are contained in PETERSILIA & TURNER, supra note 13.
50 This may be so because the probationers at a particular site were rather homoge-
neous, having been screened by a number of criteria for inclusion (e.g., a majority of
Ventura offenders were high-risk, and most Los Angeles offenders had rather similar
prior criminal records).
51 While no differential program effects were found for probationers with different
backgrounds, the following characteristics were generally shown to be related to recidi-
vism, regardless of program type: prior criminal record (those with prior incarcerations
had higher recidivism rates); risk level (higher-risk persons had higher recidivism rates);
living arrangement (those who lived alone had higher recidivism rates); and level of
drug needs (those with greater drug needs had higher recidivism rates).
52 Zedlewski argues that crimes committed by probationers also entail social costs,
such as victims' losses from missed work and hospital bills, as well as increased fear,
which can translate into the purchase of more private security. See EDWIN W. ZEDLEWSKI,
MAKING CONFINEMENT DEcIsIONS (National Institute of Justice 1987). No adequate
method presently exists for quantifying such social costs, so they are not included here.
However, they are likely to be substantial.
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were averaged, and the averages were used in the cost calculations.
The average costs of processing an arrest or a technical violation
were adapted from Haynes and Larsen. 53 The daily costs of prison
were taken from the California Commission on Inmate Population
Management. 54
Table 11 shows the daily cost factors and annual costs of the
various ISP, ESP, and control programs. The table also shows the
days during the total one-year follow-up period that the probation-
ers spent in various corrections programs. Across the sites, the ISP
probationers were actually on ISP an average of six months.
The cost totals show that placing felons on routine probation is
much more costly than the currently estimated $300 to $2,000. The
estimated corrections costs of the California routine probation pro-
grams studied here range from $4,024 to $6,122, simply because so
many offenders on routine probation have violations and are sent to
jail or prison.
In terms of correctional costs alone, ISP as implemented in
Contra Costa and Los Angeles Counties costs about $1,500 to
$1,900 more than routine probation. Ventura's ISP and CRMT pro-
grams cost about the same, $6,957 versus $7,654. Court costs of
between $900 and $1,950 in addition to the correctional costs result
in yearly costs expended per routine or CRMT probationer that are
between $4,923 and $9,606. It is also worth noting that the costs of
ESP (the electronic monitoring ISP program) in Los Angeles were
not greater than the costs of the Los Angeles ISP program, which
had no electronic monitoring; persons assigned to either of the two
programs cost the corrections system about $7,500 during the one-
year follow-up period. The actual costs of a fully implemented ESP
program may be higher than the costs reported here because only
44% of the ESP probationers were actually placed on ESP during
the study period.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
A. INTERPRETING THE FINDINGS
These findings raise a number of difficult questions and com-
plex issues, the most obvious of which are:
53 See Haynes & Larsen, supra note 20.
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1. Why should ISP probationers in California have failure (tech-
nical violation and arrest) rates so much higher than those in
other states?
2. If probationers in ISP programs are monitored so much more
intensively than those on routine probation, why are the arrest
rates virtually the same?
3. Is there continued justification for ISP programs?
4. What course should ISP programs take in the future?
1. Why Did the California ISP Probationers Have Higher Failure Rates
than Probationers in ISP Programs in Other States?
The answer to this question is fairly straightforward. The pro-
bationers in the California ISP programs were more serious offend-
ers and were at higher risk of recidivism than those who participated
in most of the previously evaluated ISPs. Although the California
sites chose to implement probation-enhancement ISP programs,
their participants were more serious offenders than those who par-
ticipated in prison-diversion ISPs in many other places. For exam-
ple, only one-third of the participants in Georgia's ISP program
were judged high-risk. In the California ISP programs, the majority
were in this category; and in Ventura, which had the highest recidi-
vism rates, over 80% of the ISP probationers were high-risk.
It appears that earlier ISP programs enjoyed widespread sup-
port partly because lower-risk offenders have been sentenced to
them. This is not to suggest that diverting prisoners to such pro-
grams is inappropriate. On the contrary, a state that has a pool of
low-risk offenders in prison is well advised to divert them to less-
expensive community-based programs. But as higher-risk offenders
are placed in such programs, higher violation rates must be ex-
pected especially if the programs vigorously enforce their technical
conditions. Given the apparent lack of a deterrent effect of closer
monitoring on high-risk offenders, high arrest rates are also to be
expected.
The importance of this lesson cannot be overstated: States that
are considering implementing ISP programs must look closely at
their candidate pools. The design and implementation of appropri-
ate programs depend critically on recognizing differences in of-
fender profiles and understanding the risk levels of different
offender populations (e.g., parolees versus probationers) within par-
ticular geographical areas. The differences in these levels also must
be taken into consideration when recidivism rates are compared
across states and jurisdictions.
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2. Why Were Arrest Rates So Similar for ISP Probationers
and Routine Probationers?
In addition to higher overall failure rates, the California results
also differ from other program results in comparative outcomes.
Other ISP programs were judged successful precisely because the
offenders who participated in them had much lower revocation and
recidivism rates than probationers on routine probation or parole.
For the three California ISP sites, the arrest rates between the ISP
and control probationers were virtually identical.
Previous evaluations, however, were not based on random as-
signment to ISP programs. Thus, the earlier comparisons of ISP
and routine probation or parole outcomes may have been mislead-
ing. Judges have been very sensitive to the risks involved in putting
prison-bound offenders in community programs and to public con-
cerns about the courts being soft on criminals. Consequently, the
population of offenders sentenced to ISP are likely to be very differ-
ent from the rest of the offender population, and the differences in
outcomes might have resulted more from differences in populations
than from the ISP programs themselves.
Because probationers were randomly assigned to either routine
probation or ISP in the California experiment, the reverse should be
true: The outcomes should represent program, not population, ef-
fects. Our results, therefore, bring into question a basic premise of
ISP, i.e., that increased surveillance will act as a constraint on the
probationer and the likelihood of detection will act as a deterrent to
crime. These theoretical effects, of course, can be expected only if
the ISP program actually does impose more conditions and surveil-
lance than routine probation does. The California ISP programs in-
tensified supervision, but they did not produce the expected effects.
More supervision, without a substantive treatment component, evi-
dently had little effect on probationers' underlying criminal behav-
ior, as manifested in their arrest rates.
3. Is There Continued Justification for ISP Programs?
Our findings suggest that ISP programs, even those as rigorous
as Ventura's, are not effective for high-risk offenders if effectiveness
is judged solely by recidivism rates. Given that these programs are
more expensive than routine probation and apparently provide no
greater guarantees for public safety, is there any future for them?
That depends on what ISP programs set out to accomplish and what




As noted earlier, ISP programs are designed to serve three pri-
mary goals: (1) to conserve scarce prison space and money that
would otherwise be spent on incarceration; (2) to keep offenders
from committing crimes in the community while they are on proba-
tion; and (3) to impose a punishment less severe than prison, but
more severe than routine probation. For high-risk offenders, ISP
programs are slightly more expensive but apparently no more effec-
tive than routine probation in lowering recidivism rates. However,
the programs evaluated here did impose an "intermediate" punish-
ment, for which the court-ordered conditions were more credibly
monitored and enforced than was possible with routine probation.
Discussions about whether ISP is a promising direction for crime-
control policy must therefore move from micro-level questions,
such as whether programs benefit their subjects, to macro-level con-
cerns about ISP programs' contributions to overall sentepicing
policy.
The most compelling reason for continued development of ISP
programs is the criminal justice system objective ofjust deserts, i.e.,
making the punishment fit the crime. California courts presently
place many high-risk offenders on probation, where caseloads of
150 or more preclude probation officers from providing close su-
pervision. Probation supervision in California is often little more
than unsupervised community release and monitoring for rearrest.
Caseloads in many jurisdictions permit only minimal contact with
the probationer. Thus, routine probation clearly does not consti-
tute just punishment for felons with serious prior records.
The problem of inappropriate punishment also exists for less
serious offenders. In the absence of intermediate sanctions, some
states imprison people whose crimes and records hardly seem to
merit incarceration. The low recidivism rates of some prison-
diversion ISP programs appear to validate this. Justice is not served
by putting many low-risk offenders in prison. In states with large
pools of such offenders, building more prisons is neither cost-effec-
tive, rational, nor humane.
Ideally, the system should develop a continuum of punish-
ments, ranging from warnings and restitution, through diverse com-
munity-based punishments (including community service, routine
probation and ISP) to incarceration. Sanctions could then be ad-
55 The issue also requires more research. This study has taken a first step in experi-
mental analysis. Further research using random assignment is needed in jurisdictions
with different risk populations and resources.
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justed to suit the individual offender's crime, prior record, and
threat to the community. Developing and implementing such a con-
tinuum would not be a trivial undertaking, however, and it cannot
be accomplished by fiddling at the margins of the existing correc-
tions system. Revamping the system will require single-minded un-
derstanding of the problem and public acceptance of the need, as
well as a serious commitment of will and resources.
To achieve public acceptance, the case also must be made that
ISP can reasonably constitute just deserts for serious offenders.
The California ISP programs certainly came closer to being an ap-
propriate penalty than routine probation did, in terms of the con-
straints and requirements that ISP imposed on probationers. The
ISP programs were clearly more intrusive and constraining than
routine probation in both structure and intent, with participants
having two to three times more face-to-face and telephone contacts
and law-enforcement checks than routine probationers had.
Nevertheless, most people would argue that ISP is less punitive
than state prison; and indeed, prison does come closer than ISP to
the norm of punishment for a large percentage of high-risk offend-
ers. There are two responses to this argument: (1) In many states,
there is no more room in prison, and ISP imposes at least some
degree of punishment; and (2) as their behavior attests, high-risk
offenders are not "most people," and they may have a different per-
ception of the ISP/prison comparison.
In Marion County, Oregon, selected nonviolent offenders were
given the choice of serving a prison term or returning to the com-
munity to participate in an ISP program. These offenders had been
convicted, and the judge had imposed prison sentences. During the
one-year study period, about a third of those eligible to participate
in the experiment chose prison instead of ISP.56 Obviously, prison
conditions seem less punishing than ISP requirements to some of-
fenders. Further, in some states, offenders know that they will have
to spend more time on ISP than they would spend in prison. That
certainly is the case in California, where a two to three-year prison
sentence often translates into less than six months of actual prison
time. 57
4. What Course Should ISP Programs Take in the Future?
Even if the public and politicians accept the arguments favoring
56 Joan Petersilia, When Probation Becomes More Dreaded Than Prison, 54 FED. PROBATION
23 (1990).
57 See supra note 54.
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ISP programs, their long-term viability may depend on realistic
reappraisal of what they can be expected to accomplish, on a shift in
emphasis, and on different criteria for judging effectiveness.
a. Reappraising What ISP Can Accomplish
What ISP programs can accomplish depends largely on the na-
ture of the candidate pool and other aspects of the corrections envi-
ronment. As noted, ISP (as implemented at the three California
sites) does not appear to deter many high-risk offenders, and it will
not be able to incapacitate them unless the local jails have more
space than most jurisdictions currently have. In this situation, ISP
programs function primarily as a way to impose conditions that
come closer to just deserts than routine probation can.
Because they have better access to treatment programs and job-
placement services, ISP programs also have some potential for reha-
bilitating offenders. At all three California sites, probationers who
received counseling, who were employed, who paid restitution, and
who did community service had less recidivism. Because the level of
participation in such program activities was low, however, these ac-
tivities may not have had much effect on the sites' overall recidivism
rates. Nevertheless, the finding of a difference in recidivism has im-
portant implications for treatment and outcomes. Whether the par-
ticipants who exhibited lower recidivism were truly rehabilitated
remains to be seen; a follow-up longer than one year would be re-
quired to determine that. Still, the reduction in recidivism is consid-
ered a positive sign of rehabilitation, and it seems reasonable to
conjecture that overall outcomes might have been different if a
greater proportion of the sample had been employed and had par-
ticipated in drug-treatment programs.
The study's results indicate that greater emphasis on drug
treatment is particularly important for ISP. At all three sites, about
half of the offenders had serious drug problems: 53% in Ventura,
41% in Los Angeles, and 42% in Contra Costa. Most of the rest
probably also had some drug involvement. Yet site staff had trouble
obtaining drug treatment for these probationers. In Los Angeles,
for example, only one out of five ISP probationers with high drug-
treatment needs received drug counseling. The critical need for
such counseling is underlined by the drug/crime nexus: About one-
third of all new arrests were drug-related.
Probationers cannot be expected to overcome drug and alcohol
addictions just because they know they will be subjected to urinal-
ysis. Even if some probationers might be deterred by fear of revoca-
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tion, those who are involved with drugs and alcohol usually do not
think rationally and clearly. Drug use alters the cost-benefit assess-
ment of engaging in crime.58 Further, if the drug users are already
embracing high-risk behavior in their addictions, they clearly are not
risk-weighers. Thus, drug testing can hardly be expected to have
much effect on their habits.
b. Shifting the Emphasis of ISP
The prevalence of drug involvement among probationers and
offenders alike raises the issue of the emphasis ISP places on condi-
tions and technical violations of those conditions. Drug use is one
of the major reasons for the high revocation and recidivism rates of
probationers who are serious offenders, most of whom have drug
histories and/or problems. If drug users are excluded from ISP eli-
gibility, the candidate pool will virtually dry up. If they are not ex-
cluded and drug testing is included in the ISP program, violation
rates will probably be high; and if a program responds rigorously to
violations, it will have high incarceration rates.
The emphasis on technical violations largely reflects the as-
sumption that such violations are proxies for criminal behavior, i.e.,
signals that offenders are "going bad," and thus, if an offender's
probation is revoked for such violations, the system may be prevent-
ing crimes. That assumption had not been tested empirically prior
to this study. One of our most important findings is that probation-
ers who had technical violations were no more likely to have new
arrests than those who did not.
Since technical violations evidently are not proxies for criminal
behavior, it seems reasonable to question ISP programs' emphasis
on them, especially the practice of sending probationers to prison
for violating them. The effort and resources spent on monitoring
and incarcerating people for technical violations might be better
spent, for example, on more drug/alcohol treatment and job place-
ment efforts.
One argument against reducing the emphasis on technical vio-
lations is that this would effectively reduce ISP's punitiveness. Con-
ditions such as curfew, drug testing, and reporting are central to
ISP's purpose and its difference from routine probation. If a pro-
gram does not monitor observance of its conditions or revoke par-
ticipation for failure to meet them, why should probationers be
expected to comply? If the conditions are merely nominal require-
58 Lloyd Ohlin & Michael Tonry, Program on Human Development and Criminal
Behavior Phase II Final Report (1989) (unpublished report on file with the authors).
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ments, how does ISP differ from routine probation? If it doesn't
differ, what happens to just deserts? Given that this study shows a
lack of correlation between technical violations and arrests, the con-
nection between ISP conditions and its punitiveness needs
reconsideration.
But what about just deserts? It seems more just to impose only
conditions that are relevant to an individual's case than to set stan-
dard conditions for all probationers, which is the common practice.
Moreover, imposing only relevant conditions does not mean neces-
sarily that probationers are watched less closely. Instead, monitor-
ing could be concentrated on the limited conditions that are
imposed and on the probationers' general behavior.
If there are no significant differences in arrest rates between
ISP and routine probation, when time-at-risk is controlled (as was
the case in this study), what good does the monitoring do? Some
ISP proponents believe that ISP may well have decreased crime
rates, even though the programs did not hold down arrest rates.
Our study outcomes are based on officially-recorded recidivism
data, which are a product of the offender's crime rate and his or her
arrest probability. The ISP probationers were known by local po-
lice, and in some instances, the police were asked to assist probation
officers in making random home visits. When a crime was commit-
ted, police might have been more aware of the whereabouts of ISP
probationers, and therefore may have had a greater chance of con-
necting one of them to a crime, hence, raising his or her arrest
probability. If that did occur, then real crime would be reduced by
ISP, even though the official records imply similar arrest rates for
ISP and routine probationers. The data available for this study did
not permit us to evaluate the extent to which this may have
occurred.
c. Rethinking the Criteria for Success
The ISP programs studied here focused primarily on surveil-
lance rather than on rehabilitation. As programs move away from
rehabilitation and toward surveillance and control, some might ar-
gue that higher arrest rates should be seen as an indication of pro-
gram success, not failure, especially when dealing with high-risk
probationers. Barry Nidorf, Chief Probation Officer for Los Ange-
les County, reflected:
As I begin to look at the effectiveness of my ISP program, I question
whether recidivism rates-the number of offenders who return to
crime-are really an appropriate outcome measure. When rehabilita-
tion was our primary purpose, recidivism rates seemed appropriate.
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However, if control and community protection are ISP goals, then a
"success" might be viewed as the identification and quick revocation
of persons who are committing crimes. After all, the police are in the
business of surveillance and control, and they judge an "arrest" a suc-
cess, whereas we deem it a "failure."
If community safety is the primary goal, then perhaps an arrest
and revocation should be seen as a success and not a failure. Yet we
continue to judge these programs by how many offenders they have
"rehabilitated." It seems to me that serious rethinking about how to
judge the effectiveness of these new programs is in order.59
B. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Two conclusions emerge from this study's findings and implica-
tions: First, jurisdictions mustjudge the potential of ISP on the basis
of their own candidate pools, their own resources, and their own
political situations. Second, more research is needed on ISP, espe-
cially research involving random assignment of various kinds of of-
fenders to routine probation, ISP, and prison.
The importance of the candidate pool has been discussed above
at length. The importance of resources has been succinctly stated
by two officials in California:
As anticipated, ISP without adequate resources in the community is
only half a program. We're convinced that the proper role for proba-
tion and especially ISP includes holding probationers accountable and
taking sure and swift actions on violations, but probation must also
provide the offenders with opportunity to change. We found our pro-
bationers would not or could not wait months on a waiting list in order
to get into a drug treatment program. This resulted in continuing
drug use and a high violation rate.60
Without drug treatment programs, and with our commitment to pub-
lic safety, we ended up violating a lot of probationers who might have
succeeded if we had effective treatments. Philosophically, we assume
that drug offenders are often in states of social and emotional instabil-
ity, and that our role is to move these probationers towards commu-
nity stability and responsibility by control, counseling, drug testing
and treatment.... Unfortunately, the lack of available treatment pro-
grams was a missed opportunity for these persons and the
community. 61
It is particularly important for jurisdictions to understand how
59 Barry Nidorf, Chief Probation Officer for Los Angeles County, personal
communication.
60 Gerald Buck, Chief Probation Officer for Contra Costa County, personal
communication.




the public perceives the objectives of ISP. If the public expects and
demands deterrence and the jurisdiction has a high-risk candidate
pool, public support for ISP is not likely to be strong. However, a
number of recent studies of public attitudes about crime and pun-
ishment have discovered that Americans strongly favor increasing
the use of alternatives to incarceration, except for violent offenders.
And support for alternative sanctions increases further as the public
learns about the costs of incarceration. 62
Finally, we cannot overemphasize the contribution this random-
assignment demonstration has made in evaluating the ISP concept.
When the Government Accounting Office reviewed what was known
about ISP, it concluded that very little had been learned from the
more than one hundred projects funded by the Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration between 1970 and 1977.63 That is cer-
tainly not the case here. The California sites received federal fund-
ing in 1986; and as of 1990, they have provided solid empirical
evidence about the effectiveness of their ISP programs, what the
programs accomplished, and what they cost their local systems.
Policymakers should evaluate this critical information before invest-
ing resources in full-scale ISP programs.
From that standpoint, the ISP experiments in California have
been a great success. The jurisdictions that participated have made
a valuable contribution to our understanding of ISP and its poten-
tial as an alternative sanction.
62 JOHN DOBLE, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT: THE PUBLIC'S VIEW (1987).
63 See JERRY BANKS, SUMMARY PHASE I EVALUATION OF INTENSIVE SPECIAL PROBATION
PROJECT (National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice 1977).
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